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Impact of the 1999 Earthquakes on the 
Outcome of the 2002 Parliamentary Election in Turkey
*
 
The two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999, not only caused 
enormous amounts of death, destruction and suffering, but also exposed rampant 
government corruption involving construction and zoning code violations. The incompetence 
shown by the government in providing relief, the corruption allegations in regards to those 
efforts, and government’s failure to prosecute corrupt officials and businessmen, further 
angered the public. How voters responded to these in the 2002 parliamentary election is 
investigated, using cross-provincial data, and controlling for other social, political and 
economic factors. Our results show that voters held accountable all of the political parties 
which participated in governments during the last decade or so, and not just the incumbents 
in 2002. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for earthquake relief, and parties that 
served longest and controlled more of the city administrations in the quake zone were 
blamed more. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the beneficiary 
of the votes lost by these parties. The sensitivity shown by the electorate to real and 
perceived corruption implies that corruption problem will be tractable in Turkey, and can be 
reduced through increased transparency and democratization. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
  On 17 August 1999 and 12 November 1999, two major earthquakes, measuring 
7.4  and  7.2  on  the  Richter  scale,  struck  densely  populated  and  heavily  industrialized 
northwestern section of Turkey.  These not only caused tens of thousands of deaths and 
billions  of  dollars  of  destruction,  but  also  exposed  rampant  government  corruption 
involving violation of construction and zoning codes.  While a lot of the old buildings 
remained standing after the quakes, many of the recently constructed ones folded in on 
themselves due to their unsafe locations and inappropriate design, substandard practices 
employed  in  their  construction,  such  as  use  of  concrete  prepared  with  sea  sand  and 
insufficient amount of cement and steel bars.  What angered the public even more were 
the government’s poor performance in coming to the help of the earthquake survivors, 
and  its  failure  to  prosecute,  except  for  a  few  scapegoats,  the  corrupt  contractors  and 
government inspectors.  News reports on corruption involved in granting contracts for 
construction of new housing for the quake survivors and other relief related activities 
further intensified the public outrage.    
 
Green (2005) explains, in detail, how corruption magnified the above disasters in 
Turkey.  Escalares, et al. (2007), who studied 344 major quakes in 42 countries during 
1975-2003,  found  that  public  sector  corruption  is  positively  related  to  earthquake 
fatalities in other countries as well.   
 
  Our purpose in this paper is to study the response of voters in the 2002 general 
election, the first one following the 1999 earthquakes, to the above events.  First, we 
would  like  assess  whether  the  Turkish  voters  have  exhibited  any  sensitivity  to 
government  corruption  and  incompetence.    If  they  have,  we  would  like  gauge  how 
appropriately they have allocated the responsibility for these, among various political 
parties.    In  particular,  we  would  like  to  determine  whether  the  voters  held  previous 
governments  which  were  in  power  when  the  shoddy  buildings  were  constructed, 
responsible as well, and whether they distinguished between the parties which controlled 
municipal administrations in the earthquake zone and those that did not.   In Turkey, 
municipalities issue the permits for constructions and inspect them but they are overseen 
by the central government.  The latter by granting frequent amnesties for improperly and 
illegally constructed buildings, and the former by providing utilities and other services to 
them , encourage their spread.    
 
  Answers to the above questions will yield useful insights as to how tractable the 
issue of corruption is in Turkey, and what approaches are likely to be effective in fighting 
it.    Mishra  (2005)  shows  that  when  corruption  is  pervasive,  it  is  also  likely  to  be 
persistent.   He points out that when public condones corruption, expected cost of being 
corrupt (including probability of apprehension and social sanction associated) would be 
less,  leading  to  more  people  being  corrupt.    Then  corrupt  behavior  becomes  the 
equilibrium or the norm.  This in turn, would hamper economic progress of the country.  
Meon and Sekkat (2005), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Mo (2001), and Mauro (1995) 
find  corruption  to  lower  investment.    Countries  with  high  levels  of  public  sector 
corruption are found to receive less foreign aid, by Alesina and Weder (2002), and less   3 
foreign direct investment, by Habib and Zurawicki (2002).  Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
and Mauro (1997) find that corruption shifts public expenditures from growth-promoting 
to low-productivity projects.  Murphy, et al. (1991, 1993) show that public corruption 
would  drive  potential  entrepreneurs  to  rent-seeking  activities,  or  even  to  becoming 
corrupt officials themselves, instead of organizing and improving worthwhile production 
activities.  Therefore, we can say that corruption leads to diminished and misallocated 
resources and thus to low growth.  
 
  A secondary aim of our study is to shed some more light on the outcome of the 
2002 parliamentary election in Turkey.  In that election, the aggregate vote share of the 
three incumbent parties dropped to 14.7 percent, from 53.4 percent in 1999.  Akarca and 
Tansel (2006) show that the outcome of the 2002 election was an outlier, compared to 24 
other elections held in Turkey between 1950 and 2004.  They estimate that 24.6 of the 
38.7 percentage point drop in the vote share of the incumbent parties can not be explained 
by the incumbency and economic conditions prevailing at that time.  Although many 
studies cited government’s tolerance and even involvement in corruption in general, as a 
major contributing factor in the outcome of the 2002 election, the role played by the 1999 
quakes in galvanizing the public anger is mostly overlooked.  To our knowledge, only 
one study, Özel (2003), mentions the earthquake factor, but does not measure it.  We 
hope to show statistically the relevance of this factor.   
 
 
2.  BACKGROUND, METHOD AND DATA  
  
No data exists on government’s response time to the earthquake disasters, on the 
number of buildings damaged due to substandard construction, and on when these were 
constructed.    Neither  is  there  any  information  on  how  many  corrupt  officials  and 
contractors are let go because only a few of them were even charged.  Consequently, it is 
not possible to measure the impact of government corruption and ineptitude in regards to 
the 1999 earthquakes, directly.  However, in our opinion, whether voters showed any 
sensitivity  to  these  can  be  determined  indirectly,  through  the  impact  of  a  variable 
representing  the  number  of  residences  and  businesses  which  suffered  heavy  quake 
damage in a province per 100 people (henceforth referred to as Q), if one is willing to 
make some reasonable assumptions.  It can be presumed that, the whole country followed 
the  news  on  government  corruption  and  incompetence,  including  those  related  to  the 
earthquakes,  and  factored  these  in  casting  their  ballots.    The  coefficient  of  a  party’s 
previous vote share, in a regression relating the party’s 2002 vote share to this variable, Q 
and other control variables, would capture the blame placed on the party nationwide, for 
its performance on the earthquake and other fronts.  The people living in the provinces 
affected by the earthquakes in question however would be more sensitive to and better 
informed about the degree of government corruption and incompetence involved and the 
parties responsible for these.  Furthermore, it will be logical to assume that greater is the 
number of residences and businesses which suffered heavy damage in a province, in other 
words, the higher is the Q, the greater is the information each voter in that province is 
exposed to on the level of corruption involved and on the quality of the relief provided by 
the government.  Under these assumptions, and controlling for other factors, the effect of   4 
Q on each party’s vote share in 2002 election can be viewed as the incremental response 
of the voters who are better informed and more affected by the government corruption 
and incompetence.  Thus the estimated effect of this variable on a party’s vote share can 
give us some clues as to which parties, if any, were held responsible by the voters and to 
what extent.  The nine provinces which suffered heavy property damage in the 1999 
earthquakes are listed in table 1.  As can be observed from that table, the intensity of the 
damage varied considerably between the affected provinces.  This and the fact that there 
are many provinces at hand with zero quake damage, provides us with a good data to 
measure the effect of Q on the vote shares of major political parties which participated in 
the 2002 election.  As can be observed in tables 2, 3, and 4, the date political parties came 
to power, the time they spent in government (at the helm or as a minor partner), and the 
proportion of municipal administrations they controlled in the earthquake region, exhibit 
great variation among parties during the decade preceding the 1999 quakes.  This will 
enable us not only to measure but also to interpret the coefficients of Q in equations 
relating this variable to the vote shares of the parties.  
   
  The Democratic Left Party (DSP), the major incumbent party in 2002, came to 
power for the first time in June 1997 but got the premiership only seven months before 
the August 1999 earthquake.  The party had only a negligible number of mayors in the 
quake affected areas, none in the cities which suffered major damage, and none in the 
provincial centers where the population is concentrated.  Thus, any adverse impact of Q 
on this party’s vote share should be considered as the reaction of the voters in the affected 
areas to government’s inefficiency in providing relief and its inability or unwillingness to 
prosecute corrupt officials and their private sector benefactors, but not to the corruption at 
the local level, and not to the construction of shoddy buildings.  
  
  The second largest incumbent party in 2002, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 
came to power less than three months before the first earthquake in 1999 and after being 
out of power for two decades.  This party controlled almost none of the municipalities in 
the  areas  affected  by  the  earthquakes.    However,  the  minister  of  Public  Works  and 
Settlement, which supervises the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, was from this 
party.  He was accused after the 2002 election by the new government, of cronyism and 
receiving kickbacks from contracts his ministry granted, in regards to construction of new 
housing for the earthquake survivors and other relief efforts.  Although he was finally 
found not guilty in 2007 by the Supreme Court, it is not clear if he is vindicated in the 
public opinion, and of course the verdict was not known at the time of the 2002 election.  
In fact he was seen as a liability for his party and was forced to resign his post in 2001 by 
the leader of his party.   Eight of his top bureaucrats and forty  contractors they have 
collaborated with have been found guilty in 2008.  Therefore any significant negative 
impact  of  Q  on  the  Nationalist  Action  Party’s  (MHP’s)  2002  vote  share  should  be 
interpreted  as  a  punishment  by  the  quake  victims  for  government  incompetence  in 
coming to their aid and for corruption related to the relief efforts, but not for the pre-
quake corruption. 
   
  The third incumbent party, the Motherland Party (ANAP), held the premiership of 
the country in single-party governments between December 1983 and November 1991,   5 
and in coalition governments, during the March 1996 – June 1996, and June 1997 –
January 1999 periods.  The party was a minor partner in the coalition ruling at the time of 
the 1999 earthquakes.  It controlled substantial number of local administrations in the 
quake region since 1984.    Thus an adverse earthquake effect on this party’s vote could 
be due to the performance of its mayors and/or its cabinet members. 
 
  The  opposition  True  Path  and  Republican  People’s  parties  (DYP  and  CHP), 
shared power during the 1991-1996 period and both had large number of mayors in the 
provinces affected by the two earthquakes during the decade preceding the quakes.   In 
making  this  statement,  we  are  treating  the  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP)  and  the 
Social  Democratic  Populist  Party  (SHP)  as  one  party.    Initially  the  latter  was  in  the 
coalition  with  the  True  Path  Party  (DYP)  but  after  its  merger  with  the  former,  the 
coalition continued as DYP-CHP government.  If the vote shares of these parties are 
found to be inversely related to Q, it must be taken as an indication of voters holding 
parties which controlled central and local administrations during the time the shoddy 
buildings were built.   
 
  If the voters are rational, the Young Party (GP) should either not be affected by 
the earthquake related events, or benefit from them.  This party was formed a few months 
before the 2002 election by a business tycoon who had no prior political experience. 
 
  The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is one of the two parties formed in the 
second half of 2001 by the members of the Virtue Party (FP) after the dissolution of the 
latter by the Constitutional Court on grounds that it advocated religion based regime in 
violation of the constitution.  The Virtue Party (FP) itself was formed by the leaders and 
rank and file of the Welfare Party (RP) which was closed by the Constitutional Court on 
the same grounds used against the Virtue Party.  While Welfare Party (RP) held power 
only for a year from mid 1996 to mid 1997, many of the mayors in the provinces affected 
by  the  1999  quakes  were  members  of  this  party  since  1994.    The  Justice  and 
Development Party (AKP) disavowed the anti-Western and pro-Islamist positions of the 
Virtue and Welfare parties (FP and RP)) and rejected being a continuation of these.  The 
Felicity Party (SP), the other party that emerged from the ashes of the Virtue Party, on the 
other hand, towed the old party line and received very few votes in 2002.  Whether the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a continuation of the Virtue and Welfare parties 
(FP and RP) is a contentious issue in Turkey.  If this party turns out to have benefited 
from the government’s handling of the earthquake related issues, that would imply that 
either it was not perceived as a continuation of the Welfare and Virtue parties (RP and 
FP) or that the mayors of the latter which later joined the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) are viewed by the public as not being corrupt.  On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient for Q, for this party, would mean that it is being punished for the sins of the 
Welfare and Virtue parties (FP and RP) at the local level. 
 
  The Motherland party (ANAP) served in the central government longer than the 
True  Path  Party  (DYP),  and  the  True  Path  Party  (DYP)  longer  than  the  Republican 
People’s Party / Social Democratic Populist Party (CHP/SHP).   As can be seen from 
Table  4  however,  the  Republican  People’s  Party  /  Social  Democratic  Populist  Party   6 
(CHP/SHP) had more mayors in the population centers which suffered major earthquake 
damage, than the other two parties mentioned, during 1989-1994, and about the same 
number  as  them  during  1994-1999.    The  True  Path  Party  (DYP)  appears  to  have 
controlled  slightly  more  mayors  in  these  cities  in  both  periods  in  question,  than  the 
Motherland Party (ANAP).   Thus the differences in the estimated coefficients of the Q 
variable  in  various  party  equations  will  allow  us  to  determine  whether  the  electorate 
blamed the parties which controlled more of the city administrations, more.  For example 
if the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is found to be affected more than the other two 
parties, despite serving a shorter time in central government, it can be attributed to its 
performance at the local level.    
 
  To measure the impact of Q on vote shares of various parties, we estimated vote 
equations  for  each  of  the  major  political  parties  which  participated  in  the  2002 
parliamentary election.  These equations included other independent variables as well, to 
control for the effects of other factors.  We fitted these equations to cross-provincial data, 
utilizing  the  Seemingly  Unrelated  Regressions  procedure  of  Zellner  (1962).    This 
procedure  estimates  the  parameters  more  efficiently  by  taking  into  account  the 
correlations between the residuals of different vote equations.  We dropped from our 
sample, provinces in which the Kurdish-nationalist Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) 
has received more than 10 percent of the vote in 2002.  This eliminated 17 of the 81 
provinces, all from eastern and south eastern sections of the country. These are listed in 
the notes of Table 5.  The behavior of voters in these provinces is considerably different 
than in the rest of the country.  It is largely ethnic based and is affected a lot by the terror 
activities in this region and the government’s response to them.  Akarca (2008) contrasts 
the voting patterns in this region with the pattern in the remaining 64 provinces.  It should 
be noted that only 9.1 percent of the registered voters in 2002 resided in the provinces 
excluded.  The 2002 vote shares of the political parties considered sum to 88.2 percent of 
the votes cast in the provinces included in our sample and 85.2 percent of the votes cast 
nationwide.  Thus there was no need to restrict the sum of dependent variables to 100 
percent.       
 
  One of the important factors that needed to be controlled for, in measuring the 
impact of Q, was the unprecedented amount of inter-party vote shifts that had occurred 
across the country between 1999 and 2002.  During that period, the three incumbent 
parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the 
Motherland Party (ANAP), experienced a 38.7 percentage point drop in their aggregate 
vote share.  In addition, the opposition True Path Party (DYP) lost 2.5 percentage points 
of its vote share.  Furthermore, after the closing of the main opposition Virtue Party (FP), 
15.4 percent of the electorate which voted for it in 1999 had to choose another party in 
2002.  In short, more than half of the voters switched parties between the 1999 and 2002 
elections.   Consequently in each party’s vote equation, the 1999 vote shares of other 
parties were included beside its own.  Akarca (2008), who studied the vote movements 
between the 1999 and 2002 elections in detail, showed that the vote shifts which occurred 
were essentially from the Virtue, Nationalist Action, Motherland and True Path parties 
(FP, MHP, ANAP and DYP) to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), from the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) to the Republican People’s and Young parties (CHP and   7 
GP), and from the Democratic Left, Nationalist Action and Motherland parties (DSP, 
MHP and ANAP) to the True Path Party (DYP).  Thus the 1999 vote shares included in 
the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party 
(ANAP)  were  their  own  only,  and  in  the  Young  Party  (GP)  equation  that  of  the 
Democratic Party (DSP) only.  The Justice and Development Party (AKP) equation on 
the other hand included the 1999 vote shares of the Virtue Party (FP), Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP), Motherland Party (ANAP), and the True Path Party (DYP).  The True Path 
Party (DYP) equation included, besides its own, the 1999 vote shares of the Democratic 
Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP) as 
well.  The Republican People’s Party (CHP) equation included, besides its own lagged 
vote share, the vote share of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) in the previous election.      
 
  As shown in Akarca (2008) and Akarca and Tansel (2007), the vote shares of 
parties in a province depend also on the socioeconomic characteristics of the population 
living in that province.  For that reason, we included in each vote equation, mean years of 
schooling  for  population  over  age  of  6,  the  urbanization  rate,  and  the  proportion  of 
women in non-agricultural employment as well, as independent variables. 
 
  Finally, dummy variables are considered for the following provinces, as is done in 
Akarca (2008): Bayburt, Kilis, Malatya, Osmaniye, Rize, Sakarya, Bartın, and Yalova.  
In the first two of these, independent candidates received considerable amount of votes.  
In the first one, in addition, the Felicity Party (SP) made an unusually strong showing, 
receiving a vote share which was almost five times its national share of 2.5 percent.  In 
the third one, the votes which went to an independent candidate in 1999 returned to one 
of  the  political  parties.    Osmaniye,  Rize  and  Sakarya  are  the  home  provinces  of  the 
leaders of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the 
Young  Party  (GP),  respectively.    Their  favorite  son  candidacies  in  these  provinces 
brought  to  their  parties  extra  votes.    Other  party  leaders  did  not  have  a  strong 
identification with any particular province.  The dummy variables for Bartin and Yalova 
are included because these observations constitute outliers.  Even though the Nationalist 
Action party lost votes between 1999 and 2002 in every other province, its vote share in 
Bartın and Yalova increased.  Although substantial amount votes went to an independent 
candidate in Elazığ and to a minor regional party in Sivas, no dummy variables were 
considered for these provinces because that was the case in 1999 as well.  The equations 
are first estimated including all of the dummy variables.  Then they are re-estimated after 
dropping from each equation the dummy variables with parameters exhibiting less than 5 
percent significance (in a one-tail test) unless their absolute values were larger than 5.  
For brevity only the final regressions are presented.   
 
   
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
  Regressions relating 2002 vote shares of major political parties to the variables 
mentioned in the previous section are presented in table 5.  We will comment here only 
on the results pertaining to the 1999 earthquakes.  Other inferences that can be drawn are 
discussed in Akarca (2008) and are outside the scope of the present paper.   8 
 
  In Table 5, the 2002 vote shares of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the 
Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP),  the  Young  Party  (GP),  the  Democratic  Left  Party 
(DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the True 
Path  Party  (DYP)  are  represented  by  the  symbols:  AKP02,  CHP02,  GP02,  DSP02, 
MHP02, ANAP02 and DYP02, respectively. The 1999 vote shares of the Virtue Party 
(FP),  the  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP),  the  Democratic  Left  Party  (DSP),  the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party 
(DYP) are represented by the symbols: FP99, CHP99, DSP99, MHP99, ANAP99 and 
DYP99, respectively.  The symbols S, U, and W are used to represent the mean years of 
schooling,  the  urbanization  rate,  and  the  proportion  of  women  in  non-agricultural 
employment, respectively.  Q stands for the number of residences and businesses which 
suffered heavy damage in the 1999 earthquakes, per hundred people.  Province names are 
used  to  represent  the  dummy  variables,  which  take  the  value  of  one  for  the  named 
province and zero for all others.  
 
  The estimated coefficients reported in the table show that there was a general shift 
in votes, from the extreme right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the center right 
Motherland  and  True  Path  parties  (ANAP  and  DYP)  towards  the  Justice  and 
Development Party (AKP).  This was even more pronounced in provinces which suffered 
heavy earthquake damage.  In the latter provinces votes shifted towards the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) also from the center left Republican People’s and Democratic 
Left parties (CHP and DSP).  It appears that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
was either not seen by voters as the continuation of the Welfare and Virtue parties (RP 
and FP), or that the mayors of the latter were  not seen as  corrupt.   All three of the 
incumbent parties suffered vote losses in the quake zone that varied with the level of per 
capita damage encountered.  The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) paid the highest price.  
The Democratic Left Party (DSP), the party of the prime minister, was affected also but 
only slightly.  It appears that voters held the party in charge of the ministry responsible 
for  earthquake  relief  especially  accountable  for  the  incompetence  and  corruption 
exhibited after the earthquakes.  The fact that the Motherland Party (ANAP) was affected 
more than the Democratic Left Party (DSP), despite being a minor partner in the ruling 
coalition, indicates that voters blamed the parties which participated in the central and 
local administrations in the past as well.  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the 
adverse impacts of the variable Q on the opposition Republican People’s and the True 
Path parties (CHP and DYP) were much larger than that on the incumbent Democratic 
Left and Motherland parties (DSP and ANAP).  The fact that the adverse impact on the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) was 63 percent higher than that on the True Path Party 
(DYP) which served in the previous central governments longer, shows that control of 
city administrations mattered as well.  As we had mentioned above, the mayors serving in 
the quake-effected area who were affiliated with the former party were more than those 
affiliated with the latter.  This was true even more so in the heavily populated provincial 
centers.  Because there are no parties which controlled local governments but not served 
in central government, we are unable to assess relative blame placed by voters on the 
central and local governments.  A survey conducted by Adaman and Çarkoğlu (2001) 
however  show  that,  in  general,  urban  dwellers  in  Turkey,  perceive  central  and  local   9 
governments to be both corrupt but the central government to be more corrupt.  Our 
results here do not contradict that.  
 
  For the three incumbent parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), the estimated coefficients of 
their own lagged vote variables imply that in a typical province they have lost almost all, 
two-thirds, and four-fifths, of their 1999 votes, respectively, controlling for other factors.  
These are far more than the usual amounts of erosion that can be expected in the vote 
shares of incumbent parties due controversial decisions they make while in office and due 
to voter efforts to create checks and balances against their power.  The depreciation in the 
political capitals of the ruling parties implied by these figures is substantially higher than 
what Akarca and Tansel (2007) found for the period 1991-1995, for example.  These 
losses  no  doubt  reflect  partially  the  disappointment  of  their  supporters  all  over  the 
country with the way they have responded to the earthquakes and with their failure to 
stop or prosecute the people involved in earthquake related corruption.  These parties 
were tainted by some non-earthquake related corruption as well.  In fact, some of their 
leaders and cabinet members were prosecuted later for personal involvement in a variety 
of corruption cases.  The prime minister’s old age, his refusal to relinquish his power 
even temporarily despite his severe illness, and his self-publicized rift with the president 
which shattered public confidence in his government also contributed to the vote loss of 
incumbent parties.  The coefficients of the Q variable should be interpreted as an addition 
to these in the provinces affected by the earthquakes directly. 
 
  An analysis of the coefficients of the dummy variables reveal that votes gained by 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Sakarya, due to quake related events, were 
largely offset by the votes it lost to Young Party (GP), the leader of which ran in the 
province as a favorite son.  In Yalova, vote shares of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 
and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) were unusually high and that of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) unusually low, due to special local circumstances.  The Justice 
and Development Party’s (AKP’s) gain and the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP’s) loss 
in this province due to quake related events were almost exactly offset by other factors 
working in the opposite direction.  In the case of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the 
impact of other factors working in favor of the party in Yalova was about twice as much 
as the adverse effects of the quake related factors.  
 
   
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Our findings suggest that, in casting their ballots in 2002, the Turkish voters have 
taken  into  account  the  performance  of  all  governments  that  contributed  to  the 
magnification of the earthquake disasters.  Not just the incumbent parties at the time of 
the earthquakes but others which were in power when the substandard buildings were 
built were also held accountable.  Each and every party which ruled during the 1983 -
1999 period was adversely affected by the earthquake damage. The votes lost by these 
parties went to the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  The Turkish voters appear to 
have allocated the blame rationally, taking into consideration the division of labor in the   10 
central government, and the relative influence the parties had on local administrations.  
When they are made aware of public corruption, Turkish voters seem to be willing to use 
their electoral powers to vote out the politicians who participated in it or allowed it to 
happen.  New earthquake related laws and regulations enacted, disaster relief agencies 
reorganized, and the cabinet members and high level bureaucrats tried for corruption, 
after the 2002 election, show that the Turkish politicians realize this and are responding 
accordingly.  This implies that corruption does not have to be a persistent problem in 
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Table 1 
Number of residences and businesses which suffered heavy damage in 
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Table 1 notes: 
a/ In 1999 the administrative division of the country was slightly different.  The table is based  
    on the structure prevailing in 2002.  
 
Source:   
    Figures on the first column are provided by the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs  
    (Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the Republic of Turkey) and reflects the most  
    recent revision dated 22 April 2003.  The second column is obtained by dividing the  
    figures in the first column by the province’s 2000 population given by the State Institute of  
    Statistics (Prime Ministry, the Republic of Turkey).      13 
                     Table 2 
        Political parties ruling between 1983 and 2002  
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Dec. 1983 – Nov. 1991   
Mar. 1996 – June 1996 
June 1997 – Jan. 1999    
May 1999 – Nov. 2002   
   
  
       YES 
       YES 
       YES 
        NO 
 
        NO  
       YES 
       YES 
       YES 
 
 
True Path Party (DYP) 
 
Nov. 1991 – Mar. 1996  
Mar. 1996 – June 1997   
  
 
       YES 
        NO 
 
       YES 
       YES 
 
 
Republican People’s Party (CHP)  /
  
  





Nov. 1991 – Mar. 1996     
 
        NO 
        
 
       YES 
 
 
Welfare Party (RP) 
 
June 1996 – June 1997    
 
       YES 
 
       YES 
 




June 1997 – Jan. 1999  
Jan.  1999 – Nov. 2002       
 
        NO 
       YES 
 
       YES 
       YES 
 




May 1999 – Nov. 2002    
 
        NO 
 
       YES 
 
 
Table 2 notes: 
a/ In paranthesis are the Turkish acronyms of political parties.   
b/ Between November 1991 and February 1995 the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP)  
    was in power.  This party joined the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in February 1995.  
    The coalition government continued until March 1996 with the latter party as the official  
    partner.     
 
Source:  
    Turkish Grand National Assembly web site:    
    (www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/hukumetler.html).  
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Table 3 
Party affiliations of mayors of provincial and district centers where 
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Table 3 notes: 
a/ The provinces in question are the following: Bolu, Bursa, Düzce, Eskişehir, İstanbul,   
    Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak and Yalova.  Between 1989 and 2002 the administrative   
    division of the country has changed. The table is based on the structure prevailing in 2002.   
    Party affiliations of some mayors changed between two elections.  The table reflects the  
    distributions immediately after the elections in 1984 and 1989.  
b/ In paranthesis are the Turkish acronyms of political parties.   
c/ The Republican People’s Party was closed between 1983 and 1993.  This party and the  
    Social Democratic Party entered the 1994 local elections seperately but merged in 1995.      
 
Source:  
     Compiled by authors, using the data provided by the State Institute of Statistics (Prime  
     Ministry, the Republic of Turkey) on the results of the 1984 and 1989 elections, and by      
     the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the  
     Republic of Turkey) on the property damage caused by the 1999 earthquakes.   16 
Table 4 
Party affiliations of mayors of provincial and district centers where 
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Table 4 notes: 
a/ The provinces in question are the following: Bolu, Düzce, Kocaeli, Sakarya, and Yalova.  
    Centers with more than 10 percent heavy damage are the following: Bolu, Düzce, Gölyaka,  
    Kaynaşlı, İzmit, Gölcük, Karamürsel, Körfez, Adapazarı, Akyazı, Yalova, Altınova, and      
    Çiftlikköy. Between 1999 and 2002 the administrative division of the country has changed.  
    The table is based on the structure prevailing in 2002.  Party affiliations of some mayors  
    changed between two elections.  The table reflects the distributions immediately after the  
    elections in 1984 and 1989.  
b/ In paranthesis are the Turkish acronyms of political parties.   
c/ The Republican People’s Party was closed between 1983 and 1993.  This party and the  
    Social Democratic Party entered the 1994 local elections seperately but merged in 1995.      
 
Source:  
     Compiled by authors, using the data provided by the State Institute of Statistics (Prime  
     Ministry, the Republic of Turkey) on the results of the 1984 and 1989 elections, and by      
     the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the  
     Republic of Turkey) on the property damage caused by the 1999 earthquakes.   18 
Table 5    
Regressions estimated 
 
E q u a t i o n s 
 a  Independent 
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Table 5 notes: 
a/  For the definitions of variables, see Section 3.  The sample includes 64 provinces,  
     excluding the following 17 provinces: Adıyaman, Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır,  
     Hakkari, Kars, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Şanlıurfa, Van, Batman, Şırnak, Ardahan and  
     Iğdır.  Only 9.1 percent of the registered voters resided in the latter provinces in 2002.  In  
     1999 the administrative division of the country was slightly different.  The structure  
     prevailing in 2002 is used.  The equations are estimated as a system of “seemingly   
     unrelated regressions,” using the procedure of Zellner (1962).  The system weighted R- 
     square is 0.89.  The numbers in parantheses are the  t-values in absolute value.  
b/  Significant at 1 percent level (one-tail test) . 
c/  Significant at 5 percent level (one-tail test). 
 
Source:   
     Regressions are computed by the authors.  The vote shares of political parties are  
     computed using the data provided by the State Institute of Statistics (Prime Ministry, the  
     Republic of Turkey) on the results of the 1999 and 2002 elections.  S, U, and W variables  
     are computed utilizing the 2000 Census data provided by the State Institute of Statistics  
     (Prime Ministry, the Republic of Turkey).  In computing mean years of schooling (S) for  
     each province, 15, 11, 8, and 5 years of schooling are attributed respectively, to university,  
     high school, middle school, and primary school graduates in the province.  Two years  
     worth of schooling is assumed for those who are literate but not a graduate of any school.   
     The Q variable is constructed, using the earthquake damage data provided by the General  
     Directorate of Disaster Affairs (Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the Republic of  
     Turkey) and the 2000 census population figures reported by the State Institute of Statistics  
     (Prime Ministry, the Republic of Turkey).    
  
  
 